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SomeFundamental Issues
In summary, this case study of selective credit policies suggests a number
of instructive conclusions. It has often been said that governmental stabiliza-
tion measures ideally should aim at flattening the top of a boom, with its
attendant strain on resources, as well as at raising the floor of recession
activity. The selective credit restraints of 1955 came too late to flatten the
top of the housing boom, although they may have had a moderate part in
helping to contain the expansion of aggregate demand and thereby lower
the peak levels of general business activity. The considerable time lags in the
process of financing and building houses delayed the detection of maladjust-
ments in the housing and mortgage markets. Moreover, policy makers were
reluctant to interfere in an economic sector endowed with special public
interest. It appears that they were also hesitant to apply selective restraints
before a full-fledged policy of general credit restriction was adopted. The
effectiveness of the selective credit measures in the housing sector was also
blunted by time lags. Nevertheless, these measures contributed moderately
to speedy correction of maladjustments in the housing and mortgage markets
and seem to have strengthened the policy of general credit restraint.
Policy makers were prompter in extending relief to the housing sector in
1956-1957thanin initiating restraints during 1955. The relaxations and
positive aids offered in 1956-1957helpedto moderate the decline in residen-
tial construction and counteract the adverse impact on the housing sector
of accidental credit control in the form of maximum interest rates on
government-underwritten loans below competitive levels. Their effects on the
over-all demand pressure on resources were probably slight.
Any kind of short-run economic stabilization policy must skirt the extremes
of inflexibility on the one side and of over-manipulation on the other. The
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selective measures affecting housing credit in the period 1955-1957showed
a high degree of flexibility, but it is questionable whether regulations were
not changed too frequently and sometimes for relatively minute effects.
Stabilization policies should not increase uncertainty without strong reasons,
especially in a sector where the usual market uncertainties faced by builders,
lenders, and consumers are compounded by those resulting from the cus-
tomary annual changes in housing legislation. From this point of view,
sparing use of the tools provided by discretionary authority for administering
the federal housing programs seems desirable even at the risk of less
flexibility.
The record also serves to highlight the question of how private financial
institutions can avoid more effectively lending policies that magnify insta-
bility in the housing sector. The headlong rush of major institutions into
mortgage commitments on increasingly liberal credit terms and of commer-
cial banks into highly profitable mortgage warehousing transactions from
late 1953 to early 1955 are cases in point. The intense competition among
lenders for new business, which was reflected in these developments, has on
previous occasions threatened the soundness of financial investments as well
as economic stability. Excessive expansion of mortgage lending and subse-
quent wholesale withdrawal from a saturated market can expose financial
institutions to undesirable and avoidable risks as well as accentuate fluctua-
tions in residential building. The growing practice of issuing forward com-
mitments—a necessary and potentially very useful financial technique—
has made it perhaps even more difficult for financial institutions to minimize
excessive disruptions in the flow of funds into different sectors of the econ-
omy. This problem deserves intensive study.
The need for additional research to help improve the timing and execu-
tion of selective housing credit measures in the future has become apparent
at various points of this essay. Because of the substantial time lags in the
financing and building process, effective economic stabilization policies in
this sector require adequate information on early decisions rather than on
completed transactions: builders' programs as well as housing starts, local
short-term projections of the effective demand for homes derived from.
careful market analysis, credit terms at the time loan commitments are made,
and better reporting of the commitments of all major types of lending insti-
tutions, to name only a few. The time lapse between investment decisions
and completed transactions under varying market conditions needs to be
investigated more thoroughly. Also, more reliable data are required on
current conditions in local housing markets, such as vacancies and especially
the changes in the inventory of new, unsold homes. The relation between
mortgage credit terms and the prices that consumers pay for homes, and the
interaction of these variables in changing the effective demand for houses,
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bears further exploration,1 and so does the subject of the different impacts
of changing credit conditions on various economic sectors or groups of
businesses.
Apart from the imperfections of the governmental or private actions af-
fecting housing credit during the period under review, however, the experi-
ence of 1953-1957 revealed more fundamental issues. One of theseis
the great volatility of government-sponsored residential building compared
to conventionally financed construction, which raises the question of whether
the federal interest in this sector has had the ironical if not perverse effect
of accentuating rather than moderating unstable performance. The second
issue is the relation between social priorities and economic stabilization
policy. The third concerns the role of residential construction in moderating
general business fluctuations. Finally, the very purpose of adjusting the
governmental housing credit aids to cyclical change needs clarification.
Should the federal programs be administered so as to assist in maintaining
stability and steady growth of residential building or of total construction
activity or of the economy as a whole? And what are the implications of
each of these alternative objectives?
The Volatility of Federally Assisted Construction
In the period 1951-1957, annual private housing starts under the govern-
ment programs varied between 297,000 and 670,000 units while those financed
without government aid fluctuated within the small range of 6o8,ooo to
6g6,ooo units (Chart 6 and Table i). The relative variation between low
and high volumes, measured from the former, was about 126 per cent for
federally assisted construction and a little over 14 per cent, or about one-
tenth that variation, for conventionally financed starts.2 The expansion of
1953-1954 occurred entirely in government-underwritten starts, and nearly
all of the contraction of i955-ig57 was in this segment of new housing
construction. Within the government-assisted sector, starts under the V.A.
program were still more volatile than FHA-financed activity. Similar differ-
ences in relative instability can be observed in financial data. New commit-
ments on V.A. mortgages by life insurance companies, for example, at their
1For a discussion of this relationship and its bearing on housing credit policies, see
Mortgage Market Problems, Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee
on Banking and Currency, 84th Congress, 1st session, November 1955, pp. 43, 56,
77, 79-80, and 155-156 and Rainsay Wood, "Credit Terms and Demand for Resi-
dential Construction," Study of Mortgage Credit, Subcommittee on Housing of the
Senate Banking and Currency Committee, 85th Congress, 2nd Session, December
22, 1958.
2195115 the first year for which reasonably dependable data on housing starts
classified by type of financing are available. Ignoring the reconversion period of i 946-
1947, the less reliable estimates for 1948 to 1950 also reveal a much greater volatility
of government-sponsored starts (Table z).
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CHART6
Annual Changes in Private Housing Starts Financed with and
without Government-Underwritten Loans, 1947.1957
lowest point in the 1953-1957periodwere less than percent of their
peak value, while those on conventional loans were 52percent of their
peak value (Table 24).Theannual amount of government-underwritten
loans during the period 1948-1957 ranged from $3.6 to $10.2billionas
against $7.9 to $i8.6 billion for the conventional loans which are captured
in mortgage recordings (Table 2).
Thesefigures seem to carry a severe indictment of the government pro-
grams for contributing substantially to instability in the housing and mort-
gage markets.8 Waiving the question of the influence of FHA and V.A.
$Thepublic housing programs, which are outside the purview of this essay, have
also shown extremely wide year-to-year fluctuations in volume of activity. In the
period 1948-1957, annual starts under these programs (including military housing)
varied betweeni8,oooand 71,000units,and even if the Korean War period is
omitted there remains a range of 19,000to49,000dwellingunits. The forces pro-
ducing this volatility, however, are quite different from those accounting for the





Source: Tablet, columns 2 and 3.Some Fundamental Issues
on the level of residential construction and the growth of the housing sector,
do not the more moderate fluctuations in activity outside the government
programs suggest that a much greater degree of stability could be achieved
if the housing sector were "left alone?"
On analysis, the "feast and famine" in government-aided activity turns
out to result from a mixture of conditions. One of the factors contributing
to the volatility of housing starts and mortgage lending under the govern-
ment programs is the source of the demand for FHA and V.A. loans. Much
of this demand comes from groups of consumers who are in the market only
when the most liberal terms permitted under the programs are available,
and drop out when they are not. Another, and probably the most important,
contributing factor has been the rigid ceiling on the maximum interest rate
on V.A. loans, which has indirectly also led to inflexibility in the maximum
rates on FHA loans. Because of this inflexibility of interest rates, lenders
have usually withdrawn from the FHA and particularly the V.A. market
during periods of rising interest rates when net yields on other investments
were more attractive. Discounts on government-underwritten mortgages to
provide yield flexibility have been at best highly inadequate substitutes for
more freely adjustable interest rates, and even discounts have at times been
regulated by legislative mandates (Appendix A).
The unstabilizing effects of rigid maximum interest rates have been rein-
forced by the fact that the lenders participating most actively in the FHA
and V.A. programs—life insurance companies and banks—have a wide
choice of investment outlets and are highly sensitive to yield differentials on
alternative investments. In contrast, savings and loan associations, which are
more or less confined to the mortgage market, are most active in conven-
tional lending. Moreover, some lending institutions, during periods of ample
supply of funds relative to demand, have concentrated their additional mort-
gage investment on acquisitions of FHA and V.A. loans outside their normal
lending areas and, when the opposite market conditions prevail, have cur-
tailed this activity sharply while maintaining a much steadier• mortgage
investment program in their own localities or states.
The geographic volatility of lending under the FHA and V.A. programs
is clearly revealed in data for mutual savings banks (Tables 19and20).
BetweenSeptember 1954andthe end of i when net changes in
mortgage holdings reflected the great eagerness of financial institutions to
invest in mortgages, more than two-thirds of the increase in the mortgage
portfolio of mutual savings banks was in out-of-state holdings, the bulk of
which, in turn, was in government-underwritten loans. The banks added
$2.1billionto their out-of-state holdings and increased these by 59 per cent,
'Cf. "How Government Has Unstabilized the New House Market," House and
Home, December i956,p.48.
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while the expansion of within-state holdings totaled less than $ibillion,or
little over 9 per cent. During 1956andthe first three quarters of 1957,on
the other hand, when institutions became less eager to invest in mortgage
loans, less than half of the increase in their mortgage portfolio was in out-
of-state holdings. They added only $1.5billionto the latter and $i.7 billion
TABLE 19
Amount of Mortgage Loans Held by Mutual Savings Banks within Own State







































































o "Distributionof Mortgage Investments of Mutual Savings Banks," special tabulations
of the National Association of Mutual Savings Banks representing 517 banks in 1954,
523 banks in 1955, and 520 banksin1957. The coverage of reporting banks is nearly
complete. The row "Within state" shows the amount of loans serviced within the state in
which the bank is domièiled, and the row "Out of state" shows the amount of loans
serviced in other states. Generally, only FHA and VA loans can be made by mutual
savings banks outside their own states, except for a few jurisdictions in which banks can
make conventional mortgages in adjoining states. This exception explains the relatively
small amount of conventional out-of-state loans shown in the table.
to their holdings within their home states. Net investment in government-
underwritten loans out of state declined from billionduring the first
period to $i.4 billion during the (longer) second period. Net investment in
such loans within the banks' home states increased from $412 million dur-
ing the first period to $854 million during the second period, notwith-











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































in 1956-1957.Sincemost of the out-of-state mortgage investments are made
in "capital-deficit" areas,5 these areas have been subject to especially wide
fluctuations in the supply of funds for government-underwritten loans.
Thus, the inflexible interest rate ceilings have resulted in geographical
discrimination.
The mortgage insurance feature itself may also contribute to unstable
performance, to the extent that loan insurance tends to reduce the risk
deterrent in periods of ample supply of funds and sharp competition for
investment outlets. Finally, the volatility of housing starts under the federal
programs is in small part a statistical illusion. The reports on starts under
these programs are derived from the requirement that homes on which FHA
or V.A. mortgages are to be made must be inspected by the agencies' tech-
nicians at various stages of construction. Compliance inspections by FHA
or V.A., however, do not necessarily imply that the sale of inspected houses
upon completion will be financed by FHA-insured or V.A.-guaranteed mort-
gages. A careful study has shown that attrition between starts and loan
closings is greatest in a rising, and in a declining, market. To some
extent, this variation "reflects the practice of builders and lenders under
favorable market conditions to arrange for government-assisted financing
on a substantially larger share of the new housing they plan to start than at
other times, and, correspondingly, at such times, to abandon the FHA and
V.A. financing on a larger than usual proportion." 6Thus,the available data
on housing starts tend to exaggerate the instability of government-aided
construction. The year-to-year fluctuations in the amounts of FHA and
V.A. mortgage loans closed (Table 2)area more representative measure
of volatility.
The great fluctuations in government-underwritten activity might suggest
that a mortgage market comprising solely conventional loans would show
the stability exhibited by the conventional sector during the postwar period.
Such a conclusion would be unwarranted, for the stability of the conven-
tional sector has been in part attributable to the concentration of marginal
demands for loans in the government-underwritten sector. In the absence of
government-underwritten mortgages, marginal lending would still occur in
other forms, perhaps as a larger amount of junior financing, and would tend
to produce more pronounced swings than those shown by the conventional
sector in recent years. In any event, more flexible interest rates on govern-
At the end of 1955,Arizona,California, Florida, Georgia, Michigan, Oklahoma,
Texas, and Virginia accounted for 75 per cent of the total mortgage portfolio of
mutual savings banks in all "nonmutual" states. Holdings in each of these states
exceeded $ioo million, with nearly $700millioninvested in California loans and
almost $440millionin Texas loans. Cf. source given in Table 19.
MarvinWilkerson and Dorothy K. Newman, "FHA and VA Housing Statistics
and the Housing Market," Construction Review, June 1957, p. 5.
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men t-underwritten loans would reduce instability in the housing sector and
would at least remove the paradox by which governmental interference,
intended to benefit this sector, at times operates unintentionally as a power-
ful restrictive force against housing. It may be argued that this type of
control is desirable, or at least convenient, since it automatically restrains
housing when other demands are high and interest rates rise, and thus acts
as a built-in stabilizer for the economy as a whole. If it is desirable to restrain
residential construction at certain times, however, the decision to do so
could be a deliberate one instead of being left to the haphazard results of
legal maximum interest rates which were not designed to perform such
a function.
It is true that unemployment compensation and other social security
benefits, which are now generally considered to be valuable built-in stabil-
izers, were also originally not intended for economic stabilization purposes.
But this case provides no valid analogy to the effects of inflexible interest
rates. When unemployment compensation and other transfer payments are
stepped up during a recession they benefit the groups for whom they were
designed, as well as the economy as a whole. in contrast, when interest rates
on housing loans are held below competitive levels and the flow of funds
into mortgages is reduced, the housing sector is affected adversely, even
though the economy may benefit.
It suffices to say here that there are various ways of assuring greater
flexibility of interest rates on government-underwritten loans. One is a
legislative ceiling high enough to allow administrative discretion to alter
the rates from time to time; this has been the case for FHA home loans since
1934butnever for V.A. loans. Under another method, the maximum rate
would be adjusted to changes in average yields on certain well-defined fed-
eral obligations; this method is used in Canada, where the maximum on
various kinds of government-underwritten mortgages cannot exceed the
market yields on long-term government bonds pIus 1.5 to 2.25percent, and
was also proposed, but not adopted, in the administration-sponsored Housing
Bill of i Still another technique would give the local FHA and V.A.
offices authority to establish maxima in the light of mortgage interest rates
in their areas but subject to a legislative ceiling high enough to allow for
regional variations and foreseeable changes in conditions of the capital
markets. Or the rates could be left entirely to market forces, a radical
'For Canada, see National Housing Act of 1954,asamended, Section 4. For the
Housing Bill of see Chapter 2 of this paper. Whether such a formula would be
practicable in view of shifts in yield differentials and whether the relevant competitive
rates would be adequately reflected in average yields on federal obligations are open
questions for further research in the light of the structure of the U.S. capital market.
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departure from past Congressional practice on government-underwritten
loans.8
Reflections on Social Priorities
The subject of this essay obviously involves judgments on social priorities.
Thus, according to one view, the commitment of the federal government to
aid housing and community development is almost tantamount to exempting
this sector from the vicissitudes of economic fluctuations. The attainment of
housing objectives is of such overriding importance that housing should be
insulated from external disturbances. Let other sectors or industries, pre-
sumably of lower social priority, bear the burden of fluctuations if this is
necessary for maintaining over-all stability or balanced economic growth.
The idea of an ever-normal or ever-rising housing output, or at least a high-
level floor below which the government will not permit residential building
to fall, has found growing favor. Coupled with this view is often an unwill-
ingness to let "the money market have complete power of decision as to the
number of housing units we can build at any particular time."
According to a somewhat modified version, selective restraint of housing
credit is discriminatory unless other demands, such as those for automobiles
or industrial plant or equipment, also receive similar treatment.'°
An opposite view holds that the achievement of better housing is clearly
subordinate to the larger objective of stable economic growth. Consequently,
flexible use of the government housing programs as a part of policies to
moderate business fluctuations is warranted if it is effective in strengthening
these policies. Residential construction might have deserved an overriding
priority in the early postwar years of shortage of residential accommodations.
This shortage, however, has now been largely relieved although many fami-
lies still occupy dwellings considered below par on physical standards of
adequacy. Since the early fifties new construction has served the much less
urgent though desirable purpose of improving the quality of housing.
'Cf. the papers by Neal J. Hardy and Miles L. Colean in Study of Mortgage Credit;
also Albert H. Schaaf, "Federal Mortgage Rate Policy and the Supply of FHA—V.A.
Credit," Review of Economics and Statistics, November 1958.Oneof the implied
reasons for maximum interest rates is consumer protection. This point has never
received the thorough examination itdeserves. Among the many questions to be
analyzed is whether the additional supply of funds generated by free rates or higher
maximum rates would be paid for by increased costs of borrowing not only by the
home purchasers who would otherwise not have obtained financing, but also by
those who would have obtained loans under the lower ceilings on rates. The answer
would presumably depend mainly on the shape of the supply curve for funds.
Senator Sparkman, Mortgage Market Problems, p. 102.
10Cf.Leon Keyserling's statements, ibid., especially p. 65; also Sparkman, ibid.,
p.
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•.Takingall economic goals into consideration, proper policy does not
necessarily call for complete and unremitting stimulus to housing."
Conflicting value judgments such as these cannot be wholly resolved in
economic terms, but neither can they be reconciled without economic con-
siderations. One of these is the time dimension of national housing objec-
tives and of economic stabilization policies. Because the annual volume of
residential construction is exceedingly small in relation to the total housing
stock, at best 3 per cent, national housing objectives can only be attained
over a very long time; as the failure of the veterans' emergency housing
program of 1946-1947 demonstrated, there are no short cuts. The Declara-
tion of National Housing Policy in the Housing Act of 1949 recognizes this
condition by stating as one of its objectives "the realization as soon as
feasible of the goal of a decent home and a suitable living environment for
every American family. ..." Inview of the long period required for any
marked improvement in the housing supply, temporary modifications of the
government's support of housing need not seriously interfere with the attain-
ment of housing goals. Economic stabilization policies, on the other hand,
necessarily have a much shorter time horizon, and "unremitting" govern-
mental support of housing at times of inflationary pressures can seriously
interfere with the attainment of stabilization objectives. These differences in
time dimensions themselves suggest that, in the long run, the gains in
national welfare resulting from more effective stabilization policies probably
exceed the gains that could be obtained from uninterrupted efforts to maxi-
mize housing objectives; short-run compromises in achieving a long-run
objective are clearly less harmful than short-run compromises in accomplish-
ing a goal which by its very nature must be attained in the short run or fail
of accomplishment.12
A second, related economic criterion is the effect of temporary restraints
of housing credit on the long-term demand for homes. In the case of goods
or services with shorter consumption periods or acquired on impulse, the
potential demand that is frustrated by tighter credit terms may be killed
rather than deferred to a subsequent period of easier credit. Consequently,
the demand cut off to flatten the top of a boom may not be available for
"filling in" and helping sustain activity during the next recessionary phase.
This effect of restraints is minimized in the case of housing. Here, the main
result of short-run credit restrictions is deferral rather than permanent loss
of demand. Few homes are bought on impulse. Consumers adjust the quality
of their housing accommodations but slowly to changes in their income or
Robert Turner, ibid., p. zz6.
Thisreasoning obviously does not apply to a situation in which a prolonged
decline in residential construction coincides with a prolonged general economic de-
pression. The present essay does not address itself to such a situation.
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asset holdings. The time when a family first purchases a home is conditioned
largely by the family life cycle in which a span of one or two years is negli-
gible. Consequently, most of the demand eliminated by credit restraint is
likely to be reactivated when financial conditions become more favorable
to borrowers, provided that income and employment remain high.
Third, restricting housing by varying the intensity of government aid is
not discriminatory, and does not necessarily call for accompanying selective
restraints on other economic sectors or other purchases, when considered
merely as a temporary modification of special benefits conferred on the
housing sector. The federal assistance is designed to provide a permanent
stimulus .to residential construction and home purchase. If the stimulus is at
times relaxed in the interest of economic stability, this can be considered
a reasonable price to be paid for long-run benefits received by all those,
including builders, who stand to gain from the preferred status accorded
to housing. And when such action contributes to a decline in residential
construction in the midst of general economic prosperity, one cannot ignore
the very substantial stimulative influence of the government programs at
other times. 13Theseobservations hold also for another objection to using the
federal housing programs to moderate general business fluctuations, that is,
that such policies interfere with the market allocation of funds and therefore
presumably with the most efficient use of resources. The governmental pro-
grams in any event constitute interference with market allocations, and
economic stabilization policy must accept this as a given position. By the
same token, the money market does not have complete power in determining
the volume of construction, and the influence it does wield on residential
building operates as both a stimulus and a restraint at different times.
Fourth, occasional restraint of activity in the housing sector can be con-
sidered good housing policy as well as a necessary or desirable tool of eco-
nomic stabilization policy. Maximum output of new residential construction
is not the only criterion of good housing policy, at least in the short run.
Another valid objective of good housing policy is maintenance of reasonable
stability in the housing market itself. Incessant stimulation of new building
can seriously interfere with that objective if it results in excessive supply of
new homes or sharp increases in their price or in credit extensions beyond
consumers' ability to meet long-term obligations. In fact, a policy attempting
to stimulate residential construction under all circumstances could at times
meet with considerable practical problems in marketing the current output,
unless. the federal credit programs were to be converted into cash-subsidy
programs.
Fifth, a policy of incessant stimulation of housing may adversely affect
the flow of funds into other "high-priority" sectors of the economy instead
Cf. Turner, Mortgage Market Problems, p. 74.
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of activities which the proponents of ever-normal or ever-rising residential
building would consider less urgent than housing (such as automobiles or
other consumer durables or additions to industrial capacity). Since neither
business investment nor consumer credit is highly sensitive to the usual
moderate changes in the cost of borrowing, increased financing for housing
in tightening capital markets would probably draw funds away from the
capital improvement programs of state and local governments. These may
be as sensitive to credit changes as housing. Moreover, many local capital
improvements are necessary for increasing the public services associated with
additional housing construction.
All of these considerations must be balanced against the impact of selective
credit restraints and relaxations on residential construction activity itself.
business planning, continuity of production at an optimum scale,
and efforts to reduce cost can be frustrated if builders must adjust their
operations to selective credit measures as well as to changes in general
credit availability and monetary policy, in addition to the vagaries of housing
demand. This point argues in favor of sparing use of selective controls.
Also, the application of selective controls places an increased burden on
the equitable conduct of the fiscal affairs of the federal government so as
to avoid or minimize expansionary actions on other fronts when residential
construction is being restrained. The record of the fiscal policies of i
1956 on this score is not without blemish. Federal expenditures increased for
several civilian programs as well as for national defense.14 More specifically,
federal aid to construction by state and local governments was stepped up
in 1956 and more markedly in 1957 when direct federal construction also
expanded.15 The sharp rise in certifications under the accelerated tax amorti-
zation program for plant and equipment for defense purposes in late 1955
and the first half of 1956 could not but add to the inflationary tendencies
that were especially noticeable in the market for investment goods.16 It also
probably contributed to excess capacity of certain industries relative to
current or near-future sales and therefore to unbalanced resource allocation.
Further, a liberalized program of federal insurance of ship mortgages, with
"For an appraisal of fiscal policies during this period, cf. Arthur F. Burns, Pros-
perity without Inflation, Fordham, 1957, pp. 37-39.
Report of the President, January 1958, Table F-32.
3During the fourth quarter of 1955 and the first half of 1956, the amount certified
for accelerated write-off totaled $3,419 million, as against $976 million in the first
three quarters of 1955and$i,o6x million in the entire year 1954. The certifications of
nearly $3.5 billion equaled about io per cent of total business expenditures on plant
and equipment in 1956, but the actual expenditures associated with the certifications
were, of course, spread over a longer period. The amounts certified after mid-1956
dropped sharply. Defense Production Act Progress Report No. 38, Hearings before
the Joint Committee on Defense Production, 85th Congress, First Session, May 21,
1957, p.58.
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an interest rate ceiling of 6 per cent, and an expanded military housing
program drawing on private capital had a directly competitive impact on
the funds or financing commitments available for home building, although
actual production under these programs in 1956and1957 relatively
small.'7
Whatever the merits of the increased federal spending or aid programs
in comparison to housing, the case illustrates the rapidly growing problems
of equity and social priorities in the conduct of short-run stabilization poli-
cies as federal programs affecting the economy proliferate. The problems
are, of course, accentuated by the fact that Congressional and administrative
actions impinging on economic stability are quite imperfectly attuned or
synchronized.
Residential Building—Balance Wheel of the Economy?
It is sometimes alleged that selective housing credit regulations have been
employed deliberately so as to use residential building as a beneficent balance
wheel of the economy. Quite apart from the question of intent, what has
been the relation between short-term swings in residential construction and
general business fluctuations during the postwar years?
The most straightforward comparison of fluctuations relates changes in
the amount spent on residential building to changes in gross national product
(Table 21). It would, be an exaggeration to say that these figures reveal a
systematic counter-cyclical behavior of residential construction. In some
critical periods, changes in the volume of residential building have given
powerful support to the initial recovery from a business contraction. Thus,
in the general economic .recovery during the first half of 1950, before the
Korean War had had any sizeable impact on the economy, continued ex-
pansion of residential construction contributed $2.9 billion to the $17 billion
increase in GNP (annual rates), a much larger percentage than the normal
share of this sector in total output. In the second half of 1954, the housing
sector contributed more than $2 billion to the $12 billion advance in GNP.
An amendment of August 7, 1956 (Public Law 1017,84thCongress, 2nd Ses-
sion) to the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 raised the maximum amount of ship
mortgage loans that can be insured by the Secretary of Commerce from 90 per cent
of the cost of vessels to ioo per cent. As of March 1957, mortgages totaling $19
million had been insured subsequent to the amendment and another $4.1million
had been committed, but applications were pending for a much larger amount. Cf.
Housing Act of 1957,Hearingsbefore the Subcommittee on Housing of the House
Banking and Currency Committee, 85th Congress, 1st Session, March 4-15,1957,
pp. 142-144.Formilitary housing, see Title IV of Housing Amendments of 1955
(PublicLaw 345, 84th Congress, First Session, approved AugustII,1955), and
Title V of the Housing Act of 1956 (Public Law &1th Congress, 2nd Session,
approved August 7, 1956). The number of dwelling units started under these pro-
visions with FHA-insured financing rose from 2,837 in 1956 to 16,539 ifl1957 (iith
Annual Report, Housing and Home Finance Agency, 1957,p.57).
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TABLE 21
Quarterly Changes in Gross National Product and Residential
Construction Expenditures, 1948-1958







1948 I 4.4 0.1 E
II 8.2 1.8 E
III 6.3 —0.1 E
IV 1.9 —0.7 P
1949 I —6.1 —0.7 C
II —3.4 —0.1 C
III 2.4 0.7 C
IV —1.8 1.3 T
1950 I 8.8 1.3 E
II 8.6 1.6 E
III 18.8 1.6 E
IV 11.1 —1.0 E
1951 I 13.5 —0.3 E
II 8.6 —1.6 E
III 6.4 —0.7 E
IV 4.3 0.3 E
1952 I 2.9 0.3 E
II 0.3 0.3 E
III 3.7 0.1 E
IV 11.6 0.6 E
1953 I 5.9 0.3 E
II 4.3 0.3 P
III —1.7 —0.2 C
IV —6.1 —0.1 C
1954 I —1.0 0.0 C
II —1.1 1.0 C
in 3.1 1.1 T
IV 8.8 1.2 E
1955 I 13.5 1.5 E
II 8.7 0.4 E
III 10.4 0.0 E
IV 5.5 —0.5 E
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TABLE 21 (Continued)
Quarterly Changes in Gross National Product and Residential
Construction Expenditures, 1948-1958
(annual rates in billion dollars, seasonally adjusted)






















































SOURCE: U.S.Department of Commerce.
0Includesexpenditures on new dwelling units, nondwelling residential facilities such as
hotels and motels, and additions and alterations.
b E=expansion;C =contraction;P =peak;T =trough.Peaks and troughs from
standard reference dates for business cycles. National Bureau of Economic Research.
In the second half of 1958, the increase in residential outlays accounted for
$3.9 billion or 17 per cent of a billion rise in GNP.
In certain periods, stable or expanding expenditures for residential con-
struction have tended to moderate the downward pull of recessionary forces
in other sectors of the economy. In the last half of 1949, for example, when
the gross national product just about held its own, residential building in-
creased at an annual rate of $2 billion, enough to offset declines in other
sectors. During the second half of 1953. following a general business peak,
the relative stability of residential construction helped materially to keep
the decline in GNP within narrow limits, and the beginning expansion of
this sector in the first half of 1954 equaled half the drop in GNP.
At other times, reduced expenditures for new housing have tended to
moderate the pace of general economic expansion. This was the case between
late 1950 and the fall of 1951, partly under the influence of the restrictions
during the Korean episode, and again between late 1955 and mid-1957. But
between the fall of 1952 and mid-ig53, the rising volume of residential con-
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struction paralleled the general economic expansion in its late phase, and in
the firsthalfof the declining residential output paralleled the general
contraction.
On the whole, the evidence indicates that residential construction ex-
penditures usually confonned positively to business fluctuations with a lead,
cushioned recession, gave strong support to initial recovery from a business
contraction, and tapered off in advanced phases of general business expan-
sion. A more nearly counter-cyclical behavior of residential construction is
shown by other measures of housing output such as building permits, housing
starts, and construction contracts. These series, however, really indicate fu-
ture output or initial phases of activity rather than the volume of activity
itself.
The market forces mainly responsible for short-term residential building
cycles during the postwar period need only be sketched here. The line of
analysis is quite familiar and was already indicated in previous sections.
Given long-run demand and supply forces favorable to residential building,
short-run cycles in housing construction were associated for the most part
with changes in the supply of mortgage funds and credit terms, which in
turn were greatly influenced by the level of total economic activity. When
that level was rising and high, the expanded demand for funds by business,
which is relatively insensitive to increased cost of borrowing, tended to
reduce the availability of funds for housing, which is highly sensitive to
changes in the cost of borrowing. When there was slack in the economy
at large and the supply of funds was ample relative to demand, credit
became more readily available for home building and home purchase, which
are highly responsive to easing as well as tightening financial markets.18
As was shown before, inflexible interest ceilings on government-underwritten
loans have reinforced these market influences. Thus, it may be said that the
strategic factors in short-term fluctuations of residential building have indeed
been counter-cyclical in character but, because of time lags in the process
of initiating, financing, and building residential projects, they have produced
less than counter-cyclical results.
There remains the question of whether the 1953-1958 cycle of residential
construction, in which selective housing credit policies were used, showed
characteristics markedly different from those of earlier postwar cycles. Two
tests are possible on this point. One is a comparison of the duration and
severity of successive short-term swings in residential construction, and the
other is a comparison of cycle averages of total housing output during suc-
cessive short-term Obviously, these tests can give no conclusive cvi-
Cf. also Chapter 2,footnoteiHere,as on earlier occasions, cost of borrowing
is defined broadly to include noninterest Costs and especially credit terms such as
loan maturity and down-payment requirement as well as the interest rate.
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dence on the effects of governmental credit policies. The cyclical behavior
of home building and its average volume in the 1953-1958 period were
influenced by a multitude of forces which defy neat segregation and any
combination of which may have caused variations from past performance.
Nevertheless, an examination of cycle characteristics will be illuminat-
ing.
For this purpose, the period after World War II is divided into four cycles
for both housing starts and residential construction expenditures (Chart 7
and Table 22)The1953-1958 cycle of residential construction, whether
measured by housing starts or expenditures, was substantially longer than
any of the three preceding postwar cycles, mainly because its contraction
phase was more extended. The amplitude of the 1953-1958 cycle, on the
other hand, was quite in line with previous postwar experience. For housing
starts, it was about the same as in the first postwar cycle and smaller than
in the second cycle of 1949-1951.Forexpenditures, the amplitude was
smaller than in any other postwar cycle except that of
Onthe whole, then, instability as measured by the crucial test of ampli-
tude of fluctuations was not any greater in the 1953-1958 cycle than in
earlier postwar cycles, but the contraction was unusually long in view of the
fact that the decline was not associated with a severe general depression.
The long duration of the downward movement does not seem attributable
to any single cause. The business investment boom of two years, the general
credit restraints extending over a similar period, the increasingly adverse
impact on the housing sector of the noncompetitive interest rate ceiling for
V.A. loans, the time required for the governmental relief to housing in
1956 and 1957 to take hold, and possibly a weakening of the basic demand
1'The delineation of the first two of these cycles raises few problems. The period
from about mid-1951 to the spring ofi958,however, can perhaps be treated as one
or two cycles, depending on the purpose of the analysis. Because the fluctuations
between mid- 1951andthe fall ofiwere moderate and somewhat irregular, there
may be reasons for considering this period part of a longer expansion starting in 1951
andextending to the statistically clearly defined peaks of December 1954 for housing
starts and June 1955forconstruction expenditures. On the other hand, the forces
affecting residential building during the 1951-1953and1953-1958 periods were so
dissimilar that a division into two cycles is clearly indicated for the present purpose.
In construction was first subject to the restrictions imposed during the
Korean War and later to successive relaxations of the restrictions. As was shown
in Chapter 2,thehousing expansion of 1953-1954wasmainly associated with easy
credit, and its merger with the preceding movements during the Korean episode
would only blur the analysis. Moreover, the fluctuations between mid- i951 andthe
fall of 1953, while moderate and irregular, are still sufficiently distinct in duration
and amplitude to warrant their treatment as a separate cycle.
Comparison of the characteristics of the short postwar cycles in residential con-
struction with those of the period before World War II is made difficult if not im-
possible by the absence of consistent, seasonally adjusted monthly or quarterly data,
especially for the period before the thirties.
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CHART7
Annual Rate of Private Housing Starts and of Construction Expenditures for
New Dwelling Units, Monthly, 19461958
(seasonally adjusted)
for new construction compared to earlier postwar years may have all con-
tributed to lengthening the decline.
The cycle average of housing starts during the 1953-1958periodcame
close to the highest of the four postwar cycles (Table Moreover,the
average annual rate of new dwelling units per z ,ooo incremental nonfarm
households was at a peak level. Each of the postwar cycles, in fact, shows
an increase in the rate of housing starts over the preceding cycle when starts
are related to the growth of nonfarm households. In the 1946-1949 period,
new building could not keep pace with the unusually high net household
formation, but the rate of building per i ,ooo additional households improved
steadily in each successive cycle as net household formation decreased and
construction remained at a high average level. The i 953-1958cycleaverage
of expenditures on new dwellings was also substantially greater than the
average for any preceding postwar cycle, both in current and constant prices.
The share of these expenditures in the gross national product during the
io6
of Labor Statistics.Some Fundamental Issues
TABLE 22
Characteristics of Short Cycles in Residential Construction, 1946-1958



















































































a Bureauof Labor Statistics.
b This dating is somewhat uncertain inasmuchas housing production during the en-
tire year 1946 was influenced by reconversion and the confused impact of the veterans'
emergency housing program. Under these circumstances, the seasonal adjustment of
the series by the Bureau of Labor Statistics is probably less adequate for 1946 than for
other years. The decline in the annual rate of starts from 774,000 in March 1946 to 605,000
in September 1946 most likely reflects difficulties in material supplies following the initial
spurt of starts immediately after the termination of the war.
CThedifficulties described in the preceding footnote also apply here. The trough of
expenditures in April 1947 followed an apparent peak only two months earlier. It seems
to be associated with the trough in housing starts of the fall of 1946, the construction period
being longer than usual due to materials shortages.
1953-1958 cycle was higher than in any previous postwar cycle except that
of 1949-1951.
Thus, the average performance of the housing sector during the 1953-1958
cycle gives no evidence of a deterioration in the sector's position. It is, of
course, true that residential building might have done better than it actually
did; so could many other activities. But the fact remains that there is no
indication of a change in the composition of national output to the detri-
ment of housing over the cycle as a whole; on the contrary, home building
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TABLE 23
Cycle Averages of Residential Construction, 1946-1958
Initial and Terminal Cycle Dates
Number of Dwelling Units Started
. Per1,000 Increase in Annual Rate a NonfarmHouseholds 6













Initial and Terminal Cycle Dates
Monthly Data (million dollars)
Current Prices 1947-1949 Prices


























C. Expenditures on New Dwelling Units as a Percentage of GNP d

















C Startsand expenditures as reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. For cycle de-
lineations, see Table 22. The figures are cycle totals of seasonally adjusted monthly data,
divided by the number of months in each cycle.
6 To compute these rates, the averages of the annual census estimates of the increase in
the number of nonfarm households between the following periods were used: April 1947
to April 1949, April 1949 to April 1951, April 1951 to April 1953, April 1953 to March
1958 (Current Population Reports, Bureau of the Census, Series P-20, No. 59 and No. 86).
CSeasonallyadjusted monthly figures adjusted by the Boeckh index of construction
costs for residences, 1947-1949 =100.
d Because GNP estimatesare only available for quarters, the cycles of expenditures on
new dwelling units are delineated on a quarterly basis.
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continued to grow relative to net increases in household formation and in
terms of spending on new dwellings.21
What to Stabilize
Finally, the record of thie 1953-1957 period has sharpened the question of
the proper aims of selective credit policies in the housing sector. What is it
that such policies should help stabilize and grow with minimum disruption
—residential building itself, or total construction, or the economy as a
whole? The consequences of adopting any of these three goals for short-run
stabilization policies may be quite different, although the objectives are not
necessarily mutually exclusive; nor is the distinction between the three pur-
poses merely theoretical. As was mentioned earlier, something approximating
an "ever-normal" or "ever-growing" output of new homes has become a
notion widely accepted among legislators, builders, and civic groups inter-
ested in the improvement of housing standards. Consequently, even a short-
run decline in residential construction has come to be considered in many
quarters as a national calamity no matter what the circumstances are, and
one that calls for intensified government assistance to housing no matter
what other results such action may produce.
If greater stability of residential building itself were the objective,
policies might be aimed at maintaining residential construction at a maxi-
mum sustainable level regardless of general business conditions. Liberaliza-
tions and restraints of the government's housing credit programs would be
adjusted solely to this purpose? without consideration of the effects of these
actions on general economic stability. Given the influence of federal credit
programs on the housing sector, policies geared solely to the objective of
a sustainable level of home building would appear to be both fair and
feasible, although the determination of sustainable levels at any given junc-
ture would be beset with difficulties. In addition, the goal of a sustainable
volume of residential construction would avoid some of the problems created
by long lead times which complicate the use of federal housing programs
for purposes of general economic stabilization.
Maintaining a sustainable level of output, however, is not equivalent to
The foregoing analysis, as well as other parts of the paper, use available standard
series on housing starts, residential construction expenditures, and similar items. All of
these series suffer from weaknesses and are subject to errors which cannot be examined
here. On the whole, it is believed that the data provide a fair portrayal of movements
over time, which are of principal concern here, while they are less reliable as to levels.
The absolute volume of housing starts, for example, is probably understated in the
available estimates of the Bureau of Labor Statistics, and such understatement affects
directly the cycle average shown in Table 23. There is no evidence, however, that
the degree of understatement has varied over time; for this reason, the movements
indicated in Table 23 are believed to be sufficiently reliable for the general analysis
presented in the text.
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supporting a given volume regardless of effective demand. The latter policy
would at times encounter serious practical difficulty. This difficulty is illus-
trated by conditions in earlyiwhen the market for new homes was
beginning to show clearly the signs of threatening oversupply. Given current
consumer incomes and income expectations and current house prices, it
would have been impossible to sustain the going rate of residential construc-
tion even on the very liberal mortgage loan terms available at that time. To
maintain the current level of home building, even more generous credit
arrangements would have been necessary. If new legislation was required,
this would have meant delay and, for this reason alone, the rate of construc-
tion would have declined. More important, an attempt to maintain the
current level of construction would have increased the upward pressures on
building costs, land values, and house prices. Higher prices, in turn, would
have canceled much if not all of the reduction in financing costs and would
have defeated the purpose of the credit liberalization in addition to kindling
the fires of inflation. Eventually, final prices to consumers might have been
cut as a result of oversupply, but this consequence would have been greatly
delayed and would then have led to a sharp decline in new construction
rather than sustained output.
Thus, stability of residential construction in a literal sense is a highly
impractical objective. Credit policies to help achieve it are unlikely to suc-
ceed or, if they did, might merely delay and perhaps increase market mal-
adjustments. In many ways, the total construction sector would seem to be
a more sharply defined as well as a more useful Unit to be considered in
economic stabilization policies. Residential building and many types of non-
residential construction use a large amount of common resources which can
shift to various types of construction in response to changing demands, while
resource transfers from construction to nonconstruction activities or vice
versa are much more difficult. The main demand forces influencing the
volume of total construction are divided among business, consumers, and
governments, with the result that stabilization policies need not concentrate
on any single source of demand. The varying responsiveness of these three
sectors to changes in the ease of borrowing tends to moderate the severity
of short-term fluctuations in the volume of total construction. Also, other
things being equal, reasonably stable performance of a larger economic sector
is more beneficial to the economy as a whole than similar performance of
a smaller sector. For these reasons, selective housing credit policies will
probably always and quite properly take into account the current and antic-
ipated volume of aggregate construction. Whether by design or accident,
spending on total new construction in. the 1955-1957 period was in fact
highly stable, although its main components showed substantial fluctuations.
As for the third possible objective of selective regulation of housing credit,
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i.e. to help maintain general economic stability, the record of '953-1957 has
demonstrated that monetary and fiscal measures and the management of
the government's housing programs are necessarily so interwoven that it
would seem unwise as well as impractical to neglect this tool of economic
stabilization policy. Stabilization policies, whether they operate through
general or selective credit controls or through fiscal devices, necessarily
apanoramic view of economic life, although they must be concerned with
balanced composition of the national output as well as with aggregate
stability and progress. Also, as was pointed out earlier, the inclusion of
selective housing credit controls in the armory of stabilization tools need not
create inequities. But the principle of modifying the execution of federal
housing programs in the interest of general economic stability will have to
be extended to all major federal credit programs if the government's poten-
tials for counteracting economic fluctuations are to be more effectively and
more equitably realized.
In the conduct of economy stabilization policies, the real question is not
whether the influence of the federal government on the housing sector is
to be used for a purpose predetermined for all times or circumstances. No
individual business cycles are really alike, nor is the role of the housing sector
in specific cycles ever the same. Under some circumstances, selective hous-
ing credit policies can effectively aid general stability. In others, there is no
reasonable prospect that they can perform such a function. The question is
rather whether, under given conditions, the general interest is most effectively
served by employing flexible housing credit policies for accomplishing one
or the other of the three objectives that were outlined previously, or for
a proper admixture of these several realizable goals. A rigid definition of
the purpose of any means of moderating the severity of business fluctuations
would only inhibit the government's capacity to help maintain steady
economic growth.